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Abstract One of the earliest and best-established ﬁnding about electoral support for
populist radical right-wing parties is that they attract more men than women. Yet this
ﬁnding might no longer apply to France. In the 2012, presidential election, contrary to her
father, Marine Le Pen, the new leader of the Front National (FN), realized almost the same
score among female and male voters. After controlling for other sociodemographic and
attitudinal variables that explain electoral support for the FN, there is no difference
between male and female voters’ support for the party. This article examines the closing
of this gender gap in radical right-wing voting, drawing on post-electoral surveys con-
ducted in 2002, 2012 and 2014. After a brief outline of the literature dealing with the
emergence of the ‘Radical Right Gender Gap (RRGG)’, it ascertains the disappearance of
a RRGG gender in 2012, tests possible explanations for this phenomenon and debates
whether this is a temporary or a lasting one.
French Politics (2015) 13, 391–414. doi:10.1057/fp.2015.18
Keywords: France; Front National; Marine Le Pen; gender; radical right gender gap
One of the earliest and best-established ﬁndings about electoral support for populist
radical right-wing parties1 is that they attract proportionately more men than women
(Betz, 1994, p. 142). However, this ﬁnding might no longer apply to France. In the
2012 presidential election, contrary to her father, Marine Le Pen, the new leader of
the Front National (FN), realized almost the same score among female and male
voters (Figure 1). After controlling for other sociodemographic and attitudinal
variables that explain electoral support for the FN, there is no gender gap in
the radical right-wing vote any more (Mayer, 2013a, b). Explaining the closing of
this gender gap is the aim of this article. The ﬁrst section offers a brief outline of
the literature dealing with the emergence of what has become known as the
‘Radical Right Gender Gap’ (RRGG) (Givens, 2004). The second part ascertains
the disappearance of a RRGG gender in the 2012 French Presidential Election.
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The third section outlines and tests possible explanations for this disappearance.
A concluding section debates whether this is a temporary or a lasting phenomenon.
The Emergence of the ‘Radical Right Gender Gap’ (RRGG)
The term ‘gender gap’ was coined by the National Organization of Women at the
time of the election of Ronald Reagan. For the ﬁrst time since they gained the right to
vote, women gave noticeably more support to the Democrats in the 1980 American
presidential race. Since then this gap has persisted, and there is a robust relationship
between gender and the party vote, still signiﬁcant after controlling for age, class,
race and religion (Manza and Brooks, 1998; Whitaker, 2008; Abendschön and
Steinmetz, 2014). As shown by Inglehart and Norris (2003) in The rising tide, a
similar divide has appeared in several post-industrial democracies, and notably in
Europe (Giger, 2009; Mossuz-Lavau, 2009). It is an established ﬁnding that women
move more to the left than men whatever the indicator used. It was called the
‘modern’ gender gap, in opposition to the previous ‘traditional’ gender gap.
Just after being granted the right to vote, women tended to be more conservative,
and gave more support than men to right-wing parties with a traditional view of
women’s role (Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau, 1983). But their rising level of education
and their massive entrance into the labour market on the one hand, the process of
secularization and the emancipating inﬂuence of post-materialist values and feminist
18
19
20
12
19
1212
14
9
17.5
0
5
10
15
20
25
20122007200219951988
Men
Women
Figure 1: Votes for Le Pen in 1st rounds of presidential elections by gender.
Data: Cevipof electoral surveys 1988–2007, French Election Study 2012, weighted by ofﬁcial results
Mayer
392 © 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 13, 4, 391–414
movements on the other hand, encouraged autonomy and self-expression, which, in
turn, brought women voters closer to left-wing parties. This phenomenon was
particularly pronounced among the younger generations, leading Norris to coin the
term ‘generation gender gap’ (Norris, 1996). Since the 1980’s, the electoral boom of
populist and anti-immigrant radical right parties, especially in Europe, has brought
about a new cleavage, women appearing more reluctant than men to give their votes
to these parties. Betz was the ﬁrst to outline this phenomenon in his seminal study on
the radical populist right in Europe (Betz, 1994, pp. 142–148). The difference seems
to persist up to date (Givens, 2004; Norris, 2005; Immerzeel et al, 2015; de Bruijn
and Veenbrink, 2012).
A ﬁrst line of argument considers the different location of men and women in the
labour market (Studlar et al, 1998; Mayer, 2002; Givens, 2004; Rippeyoung, 2007).
Men are over-represented in manual occupations, particularly among blue-collar
workers (ouvriers) and it is precisely among the working-class that the European
radical right draws the most support (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Kriesi
et al, 2008; Oesch, 2008).2 With the lowest levels of education, income and status and
the highest rates of unemployment, blue-collar workers appear as the ‘globalization
losers’ by excellence (Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al, 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012).
In competition with cheap labour in developing countries on the one side and
immigrants inside the country on the other side, they should be more receptive to the
xenophobic appeals of the radical right. In contrast, women are more often employed in
non-manual clerical or services jobs, especially in the public sector. Therefore, they
should be in more secure positions and less exposed to the threat of immigration.3
In this perspective the RRGG would boil down to a composition effect (Rippeyoung,
2007, p. 383).
A second line of research stresses the protective inﬂuence of religion. Christian
churches all over Europe have repeatedly condemned the anti-immigrant and
inegalitarian message of the radical right in the name of the Evangels. The more a
person is under the inﬂuence of these churches, the less she should be tempted to vote
for such parties. Although a process of secularization is taking place in post-industrial
European societies, women, especially the elderly, still attend religious services more
often than men do.4 Women should therefore be more likely to hear the warnings of
the Church. Sineau has showed that in the case of France not only women are more
often regular practicing Catholics, but more receptive to the Catholic message.
At similar level of religious practice than men, they were in the Presidential election
of 2002 far more inclined to reject Jean-Marie Le Pen and his ideas. And this gap
reached a record among elderly women, Catholic and regular church-goers (Sineau,
2004, p. 220).
A third block of research puts forward the gradual diffusion of feminist ideas at all
levels of society (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). This diffusion could prevent women,
especially in the younger generations, to support far-right parties, which defend a
very traditional ideology, and reducing them to their role of spouse and mothers.
The closing of the radical right gender gap in France?
393© 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 13, 4, 391–414
Conversely, the very spread of feminist ideas, the claims for equality, the growing
presence of women in the workforce could be seen as a threat for masculine
supremacy, breeding insecurity and resentment, and feeding an authoritarian anti-
feminist backlash in favour of the far right (Perrineau, 1997). This should apply all
the more in working-class milieus, where norms of strong manhood and masculinity,
based on physical strength, still predominate (Molinier, 2004; Frader, 2008).
Another explanation for the gender gap in radical right voting focuses on the
unequal relationship between men and women in politics. For long relegated in
the private sphere, women are latecomers on the electoral scene,5 especially in France
where they got the right to vote one century after men. On the whole, they still pay
less interest to politics, and get lower grades on political knowledge scales (Chiche
and Haegel, 2002), even when controlling for age, education and social status. They
would therefore be more prone to support the mainstream and long established
parties than newcomers and outsiders like the radical rights (Immerzeel et al, 2015).
A last line of research insists on the persistence of gender stereotypes learned from
early socialization (Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; Lahire, 2001; Mossuz-Lavau,
2014). Girls are still trained differently than boys, expected to be less aggressive and
not violent. Women in surveys still more often reject the idea of war and conﬂict than
men.6 The image of virility and violence associated to radical right parties could
explain their greater reluctance to support them. In France, for instance, Jean-Marie
Le Pen has made it a habit to spice up his speeches with verbal violence and sexist
undertones (Alduy and Wahnich, 2015, p. 54). Moreover, he even physically
assaulted the female socialist mayor of Mantes La Jolie, Annette Peulvast-Bergeal,
during the campaign for the 1997 parliamentary elections. Women also appear more
sensitive than men to social norms and cues. A study based on three waves of the
CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) in 32 countries shows that men
are politically more ‘assertive’. For instance, they are systematically more likely to
vote for stigmatised parties than women (Harteveld et al, 2013, p. 12).
Despite all these explanations, the debate on the magnitude of the gender gap in
radical right voting is still open (for example, the results differ widely from one
country to another and from one election to another).7 This applies even more so,
given that the above-mentioned studies do not attempt a systematic exploration of the
RRGG. The earlier ones just acknowledge the gap, on the base of simple cross
tabulations comparing the level of electoral support of these parties by gender and by
country, sometimes only at one point of time, not controlling for the possible effect of
other variables. When they do attempt to include systematic controls (for instance
Norris, 2005; Rippeyoung, 2007; Immerzeel et al, 2015), it is usually on the base of
large cross-national surveys (European Values Study, European Social Survey,
World Values Survey). However, we should keep in mind that these surveys are not
electoral surveys. When they ask for voting intentions or past votes, it is out of
context, sometimes months away from the election itself, with the risk of giving a
distorted image of the respondent’s electoral behaviour. And the country subsamples
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are usually small, giving in the end very small numbers of declared far right voters,
(this trend is further reduced by the fact that moral reprobation is still attached to
many of these parties). Even in speciﬁcally comparative electoral surveys like the
EES (European Election Studies), the number of self-declared radical right voters is
sometimes too small to allow for any serious statistical analysis. For instance they
were only 58 declared FN voters in the 2014 wave, amounting to 16 per cent of the
declared votes (instead of the real 25 per cent). Even if we switch to PTVs
(Propensity to vote), these surveys offer a good proxy but not perfect equivalence to
real votes (Barisione and Mayer, 2015).
The Turning Point of the 2012 French Presidential Election
Taking the existence of a RRGG for granted, it is with this literature in mind that I
started working on the votes for the FN in the 2012 presidential election. The French
context lends itself well to the study of the evolution of the RRGG. The electoral
emergence of the French radical right led by Jean-Marie Le Pen goes back to the mid-
1980s. Since January 2011, his own daughter, Marine Le Pen has been chairing the
party. Since then the National Front has been electorally thriving, reaching
unprecedented scores of nearly 18 per cent in the ﬁrst round of the 2012 presidential
election, and 25 per cent in the 2014 European Elections and in the ﬁrst round of the
2015 local elections (départementales). The 2012 presidential race can be taken as a
magnifying glass of changing gender effects. In France the Presidential election is by
far the most mobilizing election, bringing almost 80 per cent of the voters to the polls
(79.5 per cent in the ﬁrst round of the 2012 election) while the European elections
drew less than half of the voters (42. 4 per cent in 2014). In other words, Marine Le
Pen attracted 6.4 million voters in the 2012 ﬁrst presidential round (compared with
4.7 millions in the 2014 European elections), even though the score of the FN
improved by 7 percentage points, from 17.9 in 2012 to 24.9 per cent in 2014.
To measure the gender gap, I draw data from three post electoral surveys,
comparing gender effects in the 2012 election with its effects in the previous 2002
Presidential Election and in the following 2014 European Elections (Appendix A).
The advantage of the two last surveys is that they were conducted on large samples
(over 2000 for the 2012 Presidential survey and over 4000 for the 2014 European
Elections survey). They are based on random sampling, which is unusual in France.
In both cases the number of declared Le Pen voters is very close to the actual ﬁgures,
a sign that less moral reprobation is attached to such a vote, showing the success of
Marine Le Pen’s normalization strategy.8 The second wave of the French Electoral
Panel 2002, conducted after the second round of the 2002 presidential election,
provides us with a baseline model (Appendix A). The 2002 Presidential Election
seemed a better choice than the 2007 election. The latter showed a sharp
electoral decline of the FN, the score of Jean-Marie Le Pen dropping to
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10.4 per cent of the valid votes. While the former took place in a context of electoral
dynamic similar to the 2012 one, Le Pen father drawing then an exceptional 16.8 per
cent of the valid votes and qualifying for the second round.
In line with most surveys at the time, our 2012 survey showed practically
no difference in the electoral support of men and women for Marine Le Pen
(−1.5 percentage points) (Table 1). The only noticeable gender gap was observed in
the level of support for the incumbent President, Nicolas Sarkozy, whose score was
6 percentage points higher among women. While conversely women gave less votes
to the Left (extreme left, Green and socialist candidates all together drew 41 per cent
of their votes from women compared with 45.5 among men).
However a simple cross tabulation is not conclusive to make causal claims.
To evaluate the speciﬁc impact of gender it is necessary to control for the effects of
other sociodemographic and attitudinal variables likely to inﬂuence support for the FN.
When Jean-Marie Le Pen chaired the FN, gender was the second-best predictor of his
electoral support, after education, in every presidential election where he was candidate
from 1988 to 2007 (Mayer, 2002, p. 220).9 I expected to ﬁnd more or less the same
pattern for his daughter in 2012, just attenuated. But all three different sets of data
I checked showed, all things being equal, that there was practically no more difference
between the level of support of men and women for the candidate of the FN.10
To measure change more precisely, I compare a series of logistic regression on
the 2002 and the 2012 elections, taking as dependent variable the declared vote
for Marine Le Pen in 2012, and for her father in 2002, opposed to all other expres-
sed votes. The main independent variables are, besides gender, sociodemographic
variables (age, level of education, occupation), religion (combining religious
afﬁliation and practice), position on the left–right scale and sympathy for Marine
Le Pen. In both surveys I have the same variables coded exactly the same way. When
I enter the above-mentioned variables step by step, on a stacked data matrix, ﬁrst
gender alone (Model 1), then gender with age, education, occupation and religious
Table 1: Votes by gender in the 1st round of the 2012 presidential election (per cent)
Votes (Percentage of valid votes) Men Women ≠
Extreme-left candidates 14 12 −2
Eva Joly (Green) 2.5 2 −0.5
François Hollande (PS) 29 27 −2
François Bayrou (Modem) 9 9 0
Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP) 24 30 +6
Marine Le Pen 19 17.5 −1.5
Others 2 (798) 2 (884) 0
No declared vote (Percentage of registered voters) — — —
Abstention, Blank vote, No Answer 17 (906) 16 (1108) −1
Source: French Election Study 2012, data weighted according to the ofﬁcial results.
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practice (Model 2), then adding location on the left–right scale (Model 3) and ﬁnally
the score of sympathy for Marine Le Pen (Model 4), the results are very clear
(Tables 2 and 3).
In 2002, there was a statistically signiﬁcant impact of gender, at all steps of the
model. Women voted less than men for Jean-Marie le Pen in the ﬁrst round of the
2002 election, whatever their age, their level of education, their occupational group,
their political orientation and their sympathy for the leader of the FN. In the ﬁrst
round of the 2012 Presidential Election, contrary to our expectations, it was exactly
the opposite: gender had no impact whatsoever, either alone (Model 1) or controlling
for the same sociodemographic (Model 2) or attitudinal variables (Models 3 and 4)
than in 2002. Hence it is important to explain the disappearance of the RRGG.
Explaining the Closure of the RRGG
Our hypothesis is that the very factors that accounted for the emergence of the RRGG
are less relevant today, because of changes on the supply side as well as on the
demand side of French electoral politics, in a context of economic crisis and political
disaffection.
Women are under-represented in manual occupations. According to French
Census data, they count for less than 20 per cent of the manual blue-collar class
(ouvriers) versus almost three quarters of the routine non-manual group (employés)
(Guggemos and Vidalenc, 2014). But in both groups, women are over-represented
in unskilled jobs, accounting for one-third of the unskilled blue collars and some
80 per cent of the unskilled employees. And if, in the aftermath of the 2008 recession,
unemployment ﬁrst hit men more than women, the latter are more often under-
employed (Guedj, 2013), in non-wanted part-time and temporary positions. Thirty
per cent of the working women (versus 6 per cent of working men) hold part-time
jobs and the proportion is above 40 per cent among women without any degree,
especially in the service sector.11 Precariousness hits these women as much as, if not
more than, male industrial blue-collar workers. Recent research on the dualization of
the labour market in post-industrial societies conﬁrms a growing divide between
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and the over-representation of women, as well as young
people and immigrants, among the latter (Milewski et al, 2011; Haüsermann and
Schwander, 2012). The deteriorating economic situation of women, especially in the
service proletariat,12 could fuel their support for the far right in 2012 and contribute
to a reduction of the RRGG.
Women are still more religious than men and more integrated into the Catholic
Community, the dominant religious group in France. And the Catholic Church
repeatedly condemned the ideas of the FN. But the relationship of Catholics with
immigrants and more speciﬁcally Islam is changing since 1990, as shown by the
annual survey on racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia conducted for the National
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Table 2: Logistic regression on votes for Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002 by gender, sociodemographic and
political variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B (es) B(es) B(es) B(es)
Gender
Men 0.444(0.11)*** 0.506(0.13)*** 0.598 (0.14)*** 0.628(0.18)**
Women — — — —
Age
18–24 — 0.440(0.32) 0.215(0.33) −,0.90(0.42)
25–34 — 0.680(0.23)** 0.602(0.24)* 0.009(0.31)
35–49 — 0.382(0.19) 0.366(0.20) −0.163(0.26)
50–64 — 0.493(0.18)** 0.479(0.19)* 0.228(0.24)
65+ — — — —
Degree
None, primary school — 1.664(0.31)*** 1.561(0.32)*** 1.186(0.40)**
Secondary — 1.394(0.28)*** 1.260(0.29)*** 1.055(0.37)**
Bac — 0.867(0.30)** 0.810(0.31)* 0.679(0.39)
Bac+2 — 0.779(0.31)* 0.747(0.32)* 1.070(0.40)**
University — — — —
Occupation
Never worked — −0.439(0.33) −0.278(0.34) −0.196(0.44)
Self employed — 0.246(0.29) −0.066(0.30) −0.033(0.39)
Lower-grade managers/
administrators/
professional
— −0.363(0.25) −0.204(0.26) −0.395(0.33)
Ofﬁce employees — 0.157(0.25) 0.272(0.26) 0.193(0.34)
Sales/personal services
employees
— 0.271(0.28) 0.415(0.30) −0.086(0.40)
Skilled/unskilled blue
collars
— −0.057(0.25) 0.052(0.26) −0.094(0.34)
Higher-grade
managers/
administrators/
professional
— — — —
Religion
Regularly Practicing
Catholic
— −0.082(0.26) −0.734(0.27)** −0.851(0.35)*
Irregularly Practicing
Catholic
— 0.356(0.19) −0.223(0.20) −0.312(0.26)
Non-practicing
Catholic
— 0.294(0.15) −0.008(0.17) 0.031(0.22)
Other religion — 0.012(0.31) −0.218(0.34) −0.207(0.45)
No religion — — — —
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Consultative Commission for Human Rights. Classically, religion had no statistically
signiﬁcant effect on the level of ethnocentrism and prejudice towards minorities,
once controlled for age, gender, education and political orientation. Since the
Muhammad’s cartoon controversy in 2005, things have changed. In the survey
conducted after these events, for the ﬁrst time, all things being equal, Catholics were
more ethnocentric than non-Catholics and their intolerance rose with the level of
religious practice (Mayer and Michelat, 2007). The greater visibility of Islam in the
public space (street prayers, headscarves, burqas) and the polarization of the political
debate on the issues of immigration and national identity is bringing Catholics to
assert more than before their own religious identity as different fromMuslim identity,
if not superior. Following reports conﬁrmed the trend (see also Michelat and Dargent,
2015), although less pronounced once the emotional reaction to the 2005 Cartoons
affair declined.13 Nevertheless, fear of Islam and of immigration could counter-
balance the tolerant message of the Evangels, among men and women alike.
Since the May 68 social movement, feminist and sexually permissive values have
diffused in society,14 making repulsive for many women, especially young and active
ones, the traditional image of women as mothers and housewives defended by the FN
at the time of Jean-Marie Le Pen. However, this traditional image of women should
be less pronounced after his daughter has taken the reigns of the FN. Marine Le Pen
is a woman, and she offers a ‘modernized-traditional’ image of women (Amesberger
and Halbmayr, 2002, pp. 17–26; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2015, pp. 11–13), which is
open to women’s economic independence and their rights to a professional career.
Marine Le Pen never misses an opportunity to remind her audience that she is a
working woman, twice divorced, taking care of three children and living ‘out of
wedlock’ with her present companion (Alduy and Wahnich, 2015, pp. 53–54).15 She
also appears more open on moral issues, saying she understands women who abort,
Table 2: (Continued )
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B (es) B(es) B(es) B(es)
Score left—right scale
(0–10)
— — 1.150 (0.78)*** 0.502 (0.99)***
Score sympathy for M.
Le Pen (0–10)
— — — 0.652(0.32)***
Constant −2.406(0.88)*** −4.415 (0.34)*** −7.462 (0.44)*** −7.113 (0.55)***
N 3170 3170 3170 3170
Log Likelihood 2069.005 1 964 337 1 700 049 1 082 788
χ2 (DF) 14.120(1)*** 118.788(19)*** 383.077 (20)*** 1000.338 (21)***
R2 0.009 0.076 0.236 0.562
*P<0.05; **P<0.010; ***P<0.001
Source: Data— French Election Study 2012, unweighted.
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Table 3: Logistic regression on votes for Marine Le Pen in 2012 by gender, sociodemographic and
political variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B (es) B(es) B(es) B(es)
Gender
Men 0.105(0.13) 0.191(0.15) 0.184(0.16) 0.155(0.20)
Women — — — —
Age
18–24 — 0.880(0.36)* 0.860(0.39)* 0.706(0.47)
25–34 — 0.668(0.28)* 0.633(0.30)* 0.5532(0.37)
35–49 — 0.517(0.23)* 0.475(0.25) 0.220(0.30)
50–64 — 0.481(0.21)* 0.467(0.22)* 0.395(0.27)
65+ — — — —
Degree
None, primary school — 1.007(0.38)** 0.839(0.40)* 0.214(49)
Secondary general — 0.415(0.39) 0.382(0.41) 0.227(49)
Secondary vocational — 1.180(0.32)*** 1.103(0.34)** 0.669(41)
Bac — 0.779(0.33)* 0.732(0.34)* 0.379(40)
Bac+2 — 0.466(0.34) 0.486(0.35) 0.595(41)
University — — — —
Occupation
Never worked — 0.802(0.39)* 0.800(0.40)* 0.214(40.9)
Self employed — 0.683(0.42) 0.391(0.43) 0.227(0.52)
Lower-grade managers/
administrators/
professional
— 0.287(0.36) 0.376(0.37) 0.669(0.44)
Ofﬁce employees — 0.726(0.37) 0.691(0.38) 0.379(0.46)
Sales/personal services
employees
— 1.415(.39)*** 1.533(0.41)*** 0.595(0.51)
Skilled /unskilled blue
collars
— 1.024(0.36)** 1.143(0.38)** 0.214(0.46)
Higher-grade managers/
administrators/
professional
— — — —
Religion
Regularly Practicing
Catholic
— −0.239(0.34) −0.867(0.36)* −0.564(0.44)
Irregularly Practicing
Catholic
— 0.083(0.26) −0.538(0.28) −0.450(0.35)
Non-practicing Catholic — 0.103(0.17) −0.147(0.19) −0.324(0.25)
Other religion — −1.174(0.38)** −1,356(0.40)** −0.803(0.49)
No religion — — — —
Score left—right scale (0–
10)
— — 0.382(0.03)*** 0.070(0.43)
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even if she criticizes ‘comfort abortion’. She is also taking the defence of women and
gays against the intolerance of some Muslims: ‘Nowadays, in certain neighbour-
hoods, it’s not easy to be a woman, or homosexual, or Jew, or even French or white’
(meeting in Lyon, 10 December 2010).
Finally, the strategy of normalization (dédiabolisation) implemented by Marine Le
Pen after she took over the party, in January 2011, is progressing. The FN’s ideas
look less extreme, as shown by the annual Barometer on the image of the NF (www
.tns-sofres.com/sites/default/ﬁles/2015.02.16-baro-fn.pdf). The proportion of the
population seeing her party as a ‘danger for democracy’, was way above 65 per cent
for decades. Yet, this number dropped to 47 per cent in January 2012. If in the same
barometer the FN is still located more to the right than all parties on the left–right
scale, the proportion of the sample seeing it as ‘a patriot right defending traditional
values’ is equal to the proportion seeing it a as ‘ xenophobic extreme right’. Contrary
to her father, Marine Le Pen does not cross the red line of anti-Semitism, saying
repeatedly that the Holocaust was ‘the summit of human barbarism’. Even the
immigration issue is framed in a more subtle way, presenting the FN as a champion
of democracy, ﬁghting Islam portrayed as a threat for freedom and for the rights
of women, gays and Jews as seen above.16 As a result, opinion polls show that
she has become far more popular than her father ever was (Mayer and Tiberj, 2015,
pp. 28–29). All this could make it less difﬁcult, less morally reprehensible and
socially stigmatizing to vote for her, especially for women.
Four lines of explanation can thus be outlined to explain the reduction of the
French RRGG:
Hypothesis 1 The deteriorating economic situation, exposing white-collar women
in service jobs as much as blue-collar working class men to
unemployment and low paid insecure jobs.
Table 3: (Continued )
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B (es) B(es) B(es) B(es)
Score sympathy for M.Le
Pen (0–10)
— — — 0.652(0.43)***
Constant −1.717(0.09)*** −3.671(0.40)*** −5.407(0.46)*** −6.032 (0.59)***
N 1652 1652 1652 1652
Log Likelihood 1444.350 1 330 194 268.427 775 314
χ2 (DF) 0.601(1) 114 757(20)*** 268.427(21)*** 669 637(22)***
R2 0.001 0.115 0.257 0.572
*P<0.05; **P<0.010; ***P<0.001
Source: Data— French Election Study 2012, unweighted.
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Hypothesis 2 Religion in a context of rising anti-Islam intolerance protects less
than before against far right anti-immigrant ideas.
Hypothesis 3 As leader of the FN, Marine Le Pen appears more women-friendly
than her father.
Hypothesis 4 Her strategy of normalization makes the party look less extreme, and
more socially acceptable.
A comparison of the regression models for 2002 and 2012 indicates that the ﬁrst
hypothesis (H1) has some ground. In 2002, once controlled by sociodemographic
and political variables, occupation has no signiﬁcant impact on support patterns for
Jean-Marie Le Pen. Education at the time is more important than class (Table 2).
In 2012, and similar to all radical right-wing parties at the time, education still has a
strong effect in explaining votes for Marine Le Pen, (Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012),
but occupation has become a signiﬁcant predictor, even when controlling by
sociodemographic characteristics and left–right orientation (Table 3). The occupa-
tional variable, it should be noted, is operationalized in a different way than in most
surveys. Instead of excluding the non-gainfully employed–retired, unemployed or
temporarily non-working respondents, these groups are classiﬁed according to the
last occupation they held, according to the idea that they were socialised in their
previous job. On the base of the Census Bureau occupational classiﬁcation (INSEE),
it is possible to separate two groups of routine non-manual employees, ofﬁce clerks,
and sales and services employees. Model 2 (controlling for age and education and
religious practice) and Model 3 (adding position on left–right scale) show that
compared with the upper class taken as reference category (higher-grade managers
and administrators, professionals), belonging to the sales and services employees
group (predominantly female, or to the blue-collar workers group (mostly male),
signiﬁcantly increases the probability to vote for Marine le Pen, with coefﬁcients
even higher for the ﬁrst white-collar group. There is also a signiﬁcant, although
lower, probability to vote FN in the group of respondents who never worked, mostly
elderly women.17
The second hypothesis (H2) is that integration in the Catholic Community does not
protect as much as before from the attraction by the radical right, among women as
well as men. This is not conﬁrmed. Our variable combines religious denomination
(Catholic, other religion and no religion) and religious practice (for Catholics only,
still the dominant religion in France). In 2002, regular church-goers are not less
inclined to support Le Pen. But after controlling for left–right orientation, in order to
isolate the speciﬁc effect of religion, and for sympathy for the leader of the FN, there
is a signiﬁcant impact of religion. Regular church-goers, men and women, are less
inclined to support the far right. In 2012 the picture is slightly different. Once
controlled for left–right orientation, Catholic integration has the same protective
role than in 2002. But even more important is the protective effect of belonging to
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the group ‘other religions’, in which today Muslims are the majority. In 2012,
Muslim respondents tend to declare their faith in surveys far more than in 2002, in a
society where religious identities are more easily expressed. And it is quite natural
they would turn against Marine Le Pen who has made of Islam her main target.
Our last two hypotheses test, in different ways, a ‘Marine Le Pen effect’. The ﬁrst
indicator is a scale of expressed sympathy for her ranging between 0 (strongly dislike)
and 10 (strongly like). As expected, this scale is by far the best predictor of votes for
Marine Le Pen (Table 3), surpassing the effect of all other variables except one. Her
personality, all things being equal, seems to have even more impact than her father’s.
For in 2002, when he ran as candidate, education, religious practice and left–right
orientation still had an impact, after controlling for sympathy for him (Table 2). The
second more speciﬁc asset of Marine Le Pen is to appear less adverse to mainstream
feminist equalitarian values, to project a less traditionalist image than her father. To
check this hypothesis, I constructed a scale of cultural liberalism, combining opinions
about the traditional role of women as mothers, as well as attitudes towards the right of
gays and lesbians to adopt children (this was quite an issue in the 2012 election, as gay
marriage was a proposal in the socialist programme). Whether I test it alone, or
controlling for all the variables previously used, sociodemographic, religious, political
and attitudinal (adding ethnocentrism and euro-scepticism), cultural liberalism has no
signiﬁcant impact on votes for Marine le Pen (Table 4). Feminism is not the issue that
matters when comes the time to vote.
To get a better grasp of gender differences in support for the radical right, I ran the
last regression (Model 4) separately for men and women (Table 4). In both
populations, unsurprisingly, sympathy for Marine Le Pen conditions the votes in
her favour. But the impact of political orientation and attitudes towards the European
Union is different. The position on the left–right scale is just at the limit of
signiﬁcance for men (0.054 for men versus 0.669 for women), signalling a more
ideological dimension to their vote choice, something that disappears entirely in the
female population. For women, rejection of European integration is the primary
motivation of their support for Marine Le Pen. They see the EU as a threat not only to
the French national identity but also to the level of social protection in their country.
The following ﬁgures show how gender interacts with these different attitudes
(Figures 2–5).
For men and women, it is the same attitudes that increase the probability to support
Marine Le Pen: a far right location on the left–right scale, a high level of
ethnocentrism, a strong rejection of the European Union and a warm sympathy for
Marine Le Pen. But these variables do not have the same impact in both populations.
A strong RRGG (11 percentage points) persists among the voters who are the
most intolerant towards immigrants and foreigners (Figure 5). An even larger gap
(28 percentage points) exists among the far-right respondents, located in the extreme
position of the left–right scale (Figure 2). In that extreme group, only half of
the women voted for Marine Le Pen (versus practically 80 per cent of the men).
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Table 4: Logistic regression on votes for Marine le Pen in 2012 by sociodemographic, political and
attitudinal variables among female and male voters
Total Men Women
B(es) B (es) B(es)
Gender
Men 0.264(0.21) — —
Women — — —
Age
18–24 0.776(0.49) 0.746(0.73) 1.210(0.71)
25–34 0.621(0.38) 0.908(0.59) 0.575(0.55)
35–49 0.307(0.31) 0.141(0.48) 0.641(0.46)
50–64 0.378(0.27) 0.692(0.40) 0.105(0.41)
65+ — — —
Level of education
None, primary school −0.028(0.51) −0.193(0.69) 0.027(0.79)
Secondary general 0.146(0.50) 0.358(0.72) −0.023(0.76)
Secondary vocational 0.408(0.43) 0.590(0.57) 0.358(0.68)
Bac 0.280(0.42) 0.260(0.58) 0.135(0.65)
Bac+2 0.513(0.43) 0.711(0.60) 0.293(0.66)
University — — —
Occupation
Never worked 0.327(0.50) 0.836(0.70) −0.075(0.82)
Self employed −0.006(0.53) 0.293(0.66) −0.487(0.93)
Lower grade managers/ administrators/
professional
0.441(0.45) 0.673(0.58) 0.287(0.79)
Ofﬁce employees 0.304(0.47) 0.918(0.64) −0.187(0.78)
Sales/personal services employees 0.858(0.52) 0.577(0.93) 0.479(0.83)
Skilled/unskilled blue collars 0.583(0.47) 0.927(0.58) 0.041(0.85)
Higher-grade managers/administrators/
professional
— — —
Religion
Regularly practicing Catholic −0.541(0.45) −0.407(0.67) −0.422(0.65)
Irregularly practicing Catholic −0.458(0.36) −0.511(0.48) −0.323(0.68)
Non-practicing Catholic −0.322(0.25) −0.425(0.35) −0.093(0.41)
Other religion −0.691(0.50) −1.674(0.95) −0.010(0.66)
No religion — — —
Score left–right scale (0–10) 0.075(0.04) 0.127(0.06) 0.028(0.06)
Score sympathy for M.Le Pen (0–10) 0.604(0.04)*** 0.528(0.06)*** 0.692(0.07)***
Scale-cultural liberalism −0.004(0.07) 0.096(0.10) 0.035(0.10)
Scale ethnocentrism 0.077(0.04) −0.096(0.06) 0.058(0.06)
Scale anti-EU sentiment 0.407(0.11)*** 0.136(0.15) 0.760(0.18)***
Constant −8.623*** −7.053*** −10.465***
N 1652 752 900
Log Likelihood 756.076 359.370 373.458
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In spite of their afﬁnity with the radical right and its ideas, half of the women did not
dare go as far as voting for its candidate. But when a strong anti-UE sentiment is
expressed, and even more so when a high level of sympathy for Marine Le Pen exists
(indicated by a score 10 on the scale), the RRGG not only disappears, it reverses
itself (Figures 3–4). It looks as if the personality of the new FN’s leader made
the difference, and helped some women take the plunge. The apparent closing of the
RRGG in 2012 France is the result of these contrasted trends.18
A Temporary or a Lasting Trend?
The 2014 survey on the European elections offers the opportunity to check the
disappearance of the gender gap in a far less mobilizing mid-term election context.
Unfortunately, it allows for only a partial replication of the 2012 models, for it does
not use the same occupational classiﬁcation as the 2012 survey, it does not ask about
Table 4: (Continued )
Total Men Women
B(es) B (es) B(es)
χ2(DF) 688.875(25) 316.600(24) 394.222(24)
R2 0.58 0.57 0.61
*P<0.05; **P<0.010; ***P<0.001
Source: Data— French Election Study 2012, unweighted.
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the previous occupation of people out of work, there is no indicator of sympathy for
Marine Le Pen, and so on. Therefore, I reduced the regression model to ﬁve variables
(Table 5): gender, age, education, religious practice and location on the left–right
scale. The analysis conﬁrms the disappearance of the RRGG. It does not matter
whether gender is entered alone (Model 1) or in conjunction with the control
variables age, education, occupation and religious practice (Model 2). But if I enter
the left–right dimension, the gender variable is just below the threshold of statistical
relevance and a mild gender gap reappears if I add attitudes to the model (Model 4,
not presented here).
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Therefore, it is premature to conclude that the RRGG is deﬁnitely closed in France.
The process is not stabilized.19 Voting behaviour depends heavily on the electoral
context and the political supply side. The 2014 European elections mobilized less
than half of the French electorate (42 per cent), and it seems that this time women
went even less often than men to the polls. The issue of turnout was probed at length
in the 2014 European Election Survey. Sixty-one per cent of the women (versus
69 per cent of men) chose the ﬁrst answer: ‘I’m sure I voted in the European
elections’. Conversely, adding the answers ‘I did not vote’, ‘I thought about voting
but didn’t’, ‘I usually vote but didn’t this time’ and refusal to answer, the proportion
of citizens that did not express a vote rose from 31 per cent among men to 39 among
women. This could in itself explain the return of the RRGG if part of the young,
unskilled women in insecure jobs who turned to Marine Le Pen in higher number in
2012 were not mobilized enough to vote in 2014. The real test will be the 2017
Presidential Election.
Conclusion
The present analysis shows that the RRGG is context dependent, sensitive to social
and political change, as well as not written in marble once and for all. Nevertheless,
I ﬁnd that women do not appear so different from men in their support for the French
Radical Right. Their votes for the Radical Right in 2012 are explained by the same
factors: intolerance to immigrants, euro-scepticism, right-wing positioning, low
education and economic insecurity. It just seems, all things being equal, that women
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Figure 5: Predicted probabilities of Marine Le Pen votes 2012 by gender and ethnocentrism.
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are politically less ‘assertive’ (Harteveld et al (2013). But in the politicized and
mobilizing context of the 2012 Presidential Election, the ﬁrst post-recession election,
dominated by the rejection of Sarkozy, ‘president of the rich’, Marine le Pen made
the difference. This shows women represent a large potential reservoir of support for
her and her party that could still increase her electoral base in the future.
Table 5: Logistic regression on votes for the National Front in 2014 by gender, sociodemographic and
political variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B(es) B(es) B(es)
Gender
Men 0.109(0.10) 0.155(0.10) 0.206(0.11)
Women — — —
Age
18–24 — 0.365(0.25) 0.461(0.26)
25–34 — 0.712(0.21)** 0.783(0.23)**
35–49 — 0.552(0.16)** 0.667(0.17)***
50–64 — 0.248(0.15) 0.355(0.16)*
65+ — — —
Level of education
None, primary school — 2.019(.39)*** 2.016(0.42)***
Secondary — 1.496(0.21)*** 1.618(0.22)***
Bac — 0.965(0.21)*** 0.998(0.22)***
Bac+2 — 0.826(0.23)*** 0.876(0.24)***
University — 0.878(0.21)*** 0.982(0.22)***
Bachelor — 0.435(0.21)* 0.513(0.22)*
Master degree — — —
Religion
Regularly practicing Catholic — −0.40(0.26) −0.618(0.28)*
Irregularly practicing Catholic — 0.583(0.13)*** 0.178(0.14)
Non-practicing Catholic — 0.556(0.14)*** 0.330(0.15)*
Other religion — −0.10(0.28) −0.045(0.30).
No religion — — —
Score left–right scale (0–10) — — 0.325(0/02)***
Constant −1.242(0.76)*** −2.740 (0.23)*** −4.676(0.30)***
N 3170 3170 3170
Log Likelihood 2262.333 2145.888 1903.489
χ2 (DF) 1.106(1) 117.551(15)*** 359.950(16)***
R2 0.001 0.083 0.24
*P<0.05; **P<0.010; ***P<0.001
Source: Data— French European Election Study 2014, unweighted.
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To go further though, as I started doing in a comparative study of the 2014
European elections (Barisione and Mayer, 2015), it is necessary to go beyond the
ﬁxation on the ‘Radical Right Gender Gap’ and take into account the heterogeneity
of the female electorate. The votes of some women – the elderly, the church-goers –
can still be explained by the ‘traditional’ gender gap. Even if they approve of the
FN’s ideas about immigration and locate themselves on the far right, they will prefer
voting for old established right-wing parties. Others – young, educated, culturally
liberal – will turn to the left even more than their male counterparts, along the lines of
the ‘modern’ gender gap. To get the whole picture it is necessary to articulate the
three gender gaps in the plural and see how they appear, disappear or overlap.
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Notes
1 I refer in this article to the deﬁnition of the Populist Radical Right given by Mudde, based on nativism,
authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2007, p. 19).
2 ‘Ouvriers’ are skilled and unskilled manual workers, not only in manufacturing and production but also
in transportation, construction, services and crafts, as deﬁned by the French Census Ofﬁce, Group 6 in
the INSEE (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, the Census Bureau) Classiﬁcation of
Professions and Socio-professional Categories updated in 2003.
3 According to the French Census Ofﬁce, 2010 survey on employment the percentage of foreigners
among the gainfully employed is 9.6 per cent among blue collars versus 5 per cent among routine non-
manual employees (the average among wage earners is 5.2 per cent).
4 According to the EVS (European Values Studies), in 2008 the predicted probabilities in Western
Europe that men ‘never’ attend any religious service is 8 per cent, while the predicted probabilities that
women ‘attend very often’is 6 per cent (François and Magni-Berton, 2014, p. 178).
5 Women were given voting rights long after men in most countries, especially in France where it took
almost a century: men gained universal franchise in 1848, women in 1947.
6 For an interesting approach of the contrasted reaction of women to the use of torture in the post 9/11
context, because of the conﬂicting impact of feminism and motherhood see Wemlinger, 2013.
7 For a recent assessment see the 2015 special issue of Patterns of Prejudice on ‘Gender and Populist
radical Rights Politics’ and more speciﬁcally the two contributions on the electoral RRGG (Harteveld
et al, 2015; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015).
8 In 2012, the difference was 2.5 percentage points (N= 266) and 1,9 per cent (N= 500) in 2014. In both
cases the numbers allow for detailed statistical analyses.
9 Drawing from the data of the 1988 and 1995 Presidential Elections Surveys and the 1997 Parliamentary
Elections Survey, a series of logistic regression taking the vote for Le Pen as the dependant variable,
showed a robust gender effect throughout the period, during which Le Pen’s party reached an electoral
threshold of around 15 per cent of the valid vote whatever the type of election, before the split of
1998–1999. The ﬁrst model controled the effect of gender, age, education, number of links with the
working class (being working class, having a father and /or a spouse-working class) and religion
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(afﬁliation+practice), a second one added ideological and political factors (party proximity, attitudes
towards immigrants, satisfaction with the way democracy functions (Mayer, 2002, p. 220). In the 2007
election one also found a clear gender gap (Mayer, 2007).
10 The TNS-Sofres Election Day Survey on telephone (Mayer, 2013a), the face to face post-electoral
French Election Study 2012 (Mayer 2013b) and also the Cevipof/Opinion Way 2012 telephone post-
electoral survey.
11 In 2011 over 40 per cent of gainfully employed women with no degree work part time (5 times the
proportion found among men) and one-third of the women with a vocational degree (CAP, brevet
professionnel) versus 5 per cent of men.
12 See the in depth study of the everyday lives of sales women and cashiers in supermarkets described by
Benquet (2011, 2013).
13 Conﬁrmed by all our annual reports ever since, available on the Website of the CNCDH http://www
.cncdh.fr/.
14 The 2012 election was before the massive right wing and Catholic mobilization against the legalization
of gay marriage, and adoption for same-sex couples, ﬁnally voted in 23 April 2013. But the general
trend of increasing acceptance of sexual minorities and women’s right has not stopped (Gault, 2013).
In the 2012 French Election Study, only 14 per cent of voters believe women are ‘above all made to
have and raise children’ and there is almost no difference between men and women (respectively 16
and 13 per cent believe so). While 41 per cent of the men but 53 per cent of the women consider
‘homosexuals should have the right to adopt children’.
15 In her autobiography Marine Le Pen presents herself as a ‘quasi-feminist’ strenghtened by her divorce
and her struggle to work and raise her children alone (quoted in Meret and Siim, 2015, p. 19, from
Marine Le Pen’s book A contre-ﬂots, 2006, Paris, Grancher, p. 188).
16 Several Radical Right parties such as the Dutch LPF (Pim Fortuyn List) yesterday, Geert Wilders’
Party for Freedom today, or the Norwegian Progress Party, or the Danish People’s party (DF), are
‘gendering’ immigration (Meret and Siim, 2012 and Meret and Siim, 2015). They present Islam as a
religion of fanaticism and intolerance threatening the rights of women, beaten up, mutilated and
ill-treated by Muslim men (Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007; de Lange and Mügge, 2015). In France,
Marine Le Pen is taking a similar turn.
17 We left in that category respondents still at school. It has no effect on the results of the regression owing
to their small number (N= 36). The series of regressions separating them from the other inactive are
available on demand.
18 One ﬁnds the same result, a disappearance of the RRGG in the presidential election of 2012 on the base
of other surveys (see Mayer 2013a, b).
19 An ongoing comparative research with Mauro Barisione in six countries including France, based on the
2014 European Election Studies, using PTVs instead of actual votes, also shows the resilience of the
RRGG (Barisione and Mayer, 2015).
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Appendix A
The 2012 and 2014 electoral surveys
1. The 2002 French Electoral Panel 2002 is a three wave panel, based on quota
sampling, conducted by TNS-Sofres for Cevipof (funded by the French Home
Ofﬁce). Here we use the post-election wave 2, conducted on a sample of 4017
people people representative of the French metropolitan population registered on
the electoral lists (quotas sampling), between 15 and 31 May 2002, by CATI. The
declared proportion of Le Pen voters in the ﬁrst round was 11.4 per cent (N= 362)
5.5 percentage point below his real score. Available at cdsp.sciences-po.fr/
enquetes.php?lang=ANG&idRubrique=enquetesFR&idTheme
2. The French Electoral Study 2012 is a face to face survey coordinated by Nicolas
Sauger at the Centre for Political Studies of Sciences Po (CEE) focused on ‘
Political Economy of Voting’. Conducted between 9 May and 9 June 2012 on a
random sample of 2014 people representative of the French metropolitan
population registered on the electoral lists. Available at www.cee.sciences-po.fr/
fr/.
3. The 2014 European Elections Study was designed by Nicolas Sauger at the Centre
for European Studies of Sciences Po (CEE) and conducted in seven Northern and
Southern European countries (France, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal
and Greece), with contrasted economic situations and party systems. The French
ﬁeldwork was done by TNS-Sofres between 28 May and 12 June , online, on
random samples of 4000 people representative of country’s citizens of age to vote
(See Sauger et al, 2015 for details).
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Appendix B
The attitudinal scales in the French election study 2012
Cultural liberalism (2–8)
Homosexual couples have the right to adopt children/women are primarily meant to
have and raise children (reversed): somewhat agree, strongly agree, somewhat
disagree, strongly disagree.
Euroscepticism (2–6)
● All things considered, do you think that France has beneﬁted or has not beneﬁted
from its membership in the European Union: has beneﬁted/has not.
● Some people may have some fears about the European construction. For each of
the following, please tell me if you personally are afraid or not: that there is less
social protection in France/that we lose our national identity and culture: it does
not scare you/it scares you.
Ethnocentrism (4–16):
There are too many immigrants in France/many immigrants come to France to only
enjoy social security/immigration threatens our jobs/all foreigners who have lived in
France for several years should have the right to vote in municipal elections
(reversed): somewhat agree, strongly agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.
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